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Abstract
The role of new media in the Arab uprisings and the news of widespread surveillance of digital and mobile media have triggered a
renewed interest in Arab audiences research, particularly as it pertains to these audiences’ critical abilities and digital media literacy
competencies. Taken for granted have been Arab youth’s widespread use of social media for activism and political expression and
their suspicion of government monitoring and privacy threats. This study questions these assumptions and attempts to provide a more
accurate picture Arab youth’s media uses, with the goal of informing the development of digital and media literacy curricula for the
region. The study surveyed 2,554 youth and compared their media uses across countries, genders, incomes, ages, and education levels.
The findings suggest low media literacy levels and media uses apathetic to political activism and focused more on entertainment with
little fear of government surveillance and privacy risks
Keywords: digital and media literacy, Arab media, media uses

The nascent field of media literacy in
Lebanon and the Arab world continues to be
hindered by several obstacles, the most daunting of
which is the lack of local research and case studies
on which to base curricular material (Melki 2014).
One relevant area of research that specially remains
lacking is the media uses of youth in the Arab
region. It is difficult to build relevant curricula in the
absence of periodic media uses studies, such as those
produced regularly in the US by the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2010), the Center for Digital Future
(2009), and the Pew Internet & American Life
Project (2009). Data from such institutions can help
academics refocus and reorient media literacy
curricula, emphasizing the media, methods, content,
and issues that are more relevant to the media
consumption and production habits of students and
youth, in general. Therefore, this study attempts to
fill this gap by studying Arab youth’s mainstream
and digital media uses and examining claims and
assumptions of media habits that tend to exaggerate
the use of digital media for political activism.

The Arab world’s media landscapes
experienced fundamental shifts since the mid 1990s
due to developments in satellite TV, mobile
telephony, and the Internet (Kraidy 2002; Rinnawi
2011), a new approach to news, such as that
pioneered by al–Jazeera (Ayish 2011), and a restive
young generation—known as the Arab youth
bulge—yearning for economic and political
empowerment (Chaaban 2009). More recently, social
and mobile media offered formerly disenfranchised
individuals profound resources that added bolder
voices to the ever more complex and growing Arab
public spheres (Etling et al. 2010; Hofheinz 2005).
These same new media have been credited with
advancing and intensify the Arab uprisings
(Ghannam 2011).
However, the role social and digital media
played in the Arab uprisings remains a controversial
and understudied topic (Cottle 2011). One extreme
argues social media was inconsequential (Morozov
2011), while another goes as far as calling it a
Facebook revolution (Huang 2011). Both extremes
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and most arguments in between offer little empirical
evidence to support their claims, despite intense
interest in the democratizing role of new media
(Pintak 2011), the multifaceted and “ongoing battle
over… the “hearts and minds” of Arabs” (Kraidy
2002, 91), and the dire predictions of ruptures in the
Arab youth bulge (Chaaban 2009). Overall, the study
of Arab media audiences continues to suffer from a
dearth of reliable empirical research (Amin 2008),
especially research on social media uses that
preceded the uprisings (Ghannam 2011). Amin
(2008) related this problem to a long history of state
obstruction and “resistance presented by government
bureaucrats and officials who maintain a proprietary,
even paranoid, attitude toward information,”
particularly public opinion surveys for audience
research, which face “barriers and constraints, from
inconvenience to imprisonment” (87).
This study attempts to partially fill this gap
by analyzing social media uses of youth in Jordan,
Lebanon, and the UAE at the very dawn of the Arab
uprisings (2011). It examines social media
consumption and production habits and compares
them across countries, genders, age groups,
educational levels, and income levels. In addition,
the study evaluates the levels of trust and social and
political values Arab youth associate with these
media.
Studying media audiences is rooted in the
uses and gratifications tradition (Blumler & Katz
1974; McQuail 1994; Rubin 1994). However, the
ubiquity, mobility, and multiplicity of media tools
and content today and their potential to empower
individuals and communities—as well se subject
them to efficient government surveillance—have
altered the purpose and scope of studying audiences
to now encompass new media and to cover “uses and
gratifications” hardly imagined before, such as
political empowerment, civic activism, simultaneous
use of multimedia, and trust in online media sources
and content. Kraidy (2008) critiqued traditional
audience research that mainly stemmed from the UG
paradigm, focused on television, and assumed an
“audience to be bound up in the nation–state” (92).
Moreover, the approach has largely ignored the
expansion of regional Arab media and the Internet.
Even the term “uses and gratifications” no longer
seems suitable to describe the complex incessant

interactive relationship between individuals and
ubiquitous media messages and tools where various
overlapping uses of media defy neat categorizations.
Most individuals today use media constantly
throughout their waking hours and often use multiple
media simultaneously for various purposes that often
overlap. Since non–use of media has become the
exception for many, it is pertinent to think of this
human–media relationship as a habit, especially that
the border between media use and non–use continues
to blur. In addition, the interaction of various media,
such as Web 2.0, mobile telephony, and satellite
services, has extended the purposes of media uses to
include organizational instruments for local and
global activism, methods for archiving evidence,
devices for emergency, and tools for calling for
action and for work and school work.
In line with Kraidy’s (2008) concept of
interactivity, media uses today extend beyond mere
media consumption and comprise a fair amount of
production. This complicates the neat division
between producer and consumer in the UG tradition.
Consumers are simultaneously producers influenced
by perceptions of how other consumers/producers
may use their media productions.
This has implications on media literacy
education and curricula. In fact, Kraidy notes, “Arab
media institutions have in recent years adopted what
can perhaps be best described as a modified
encoding–decoding model through which viewers
are given a sense of agency and where various staged
‘oppositional’ readings of the media text stand at the
heart of the new trend in programming” (97). This
further develops the conception of active audiences
with choices into empowered interactive audiences
(Kraidy 2008) who simultaneously contest and
compose multiple discourses embedded within
specific complex cultural arrangements and
dominant ideologies, where these same “audiences
‘reproduce’ the social–economic system through
their own participation in it” (99). In relevance to
media literacy curricula, this means critical
writing and reflexivity should occupy the same level
of importance as critical reading of media texts.
Moreover, the omnipresence of media
messages and technologies and their increased
association with numerous social, physical, and
mental disorders compel the consideration of the
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addictive power of this converged media system
(Lange 2008) and the importance of “more
successful designs for media literacy interventions
that can avoid boomerang effects and achieve more
positive goals that will not only help people avoid
the negative effects of media exposures but also
enhance the positive effects” (Potter 2010, 690).
Without regressing into an old conception of a
passive audience, a new media uses/habits
conception reframes the UG construct to
acknowledge that gratifications media audiences
seek generate both intention and habits, both of
which consequently drive future media uses/habits
(LaRose 2010). In that vein, habits are initially goal–
directed and actively pursued, but over time become
automatic forms of behavior. Strong habits further
weaken individuals’ reasoned process and push them
further towards the passive side of the spectrum.
However, audiences can regain control over their
media uses by exerting cognitive effort, particularly
through the use of critical media literacy
competencies.
Hence, the media uses/habits concept sets a
dialectic relationship between the agency of an
(inter)active audience and the dominant structures
that reproduce themselves through this interactivity
and by these audiences’ media habits. So, this study
goes beyond the commonly used conceptions of
gratifications to include political activism and
empowerment, and beyond the notion of a nation–
based consuming audience to include production
activities and multiple Arab countries. Consistent
with Kraidy’s (2008) recommendations, media uses
cover both news and entertainment, integrate
multiple media, and compare multiple Arab
countries and various socio–economic factors in one
design. Furthermore, in addition to the personal
utilitarian values individuals associate with media
uses, this study adds a set of political values to assess
their relevance to audiences’ perceptions of digital
media, particularly the social media and blogs
credited with influencing the Arab uprisings.
Social Media Use in the Arab World, Preand Post-Uprisings. Studies on Arab media uses,
particularly social media uses, remain rare and suffer
numerous methodological problems. Amin (2008)
offers a general review of studies mainly focusing on
TV audiences. This section reviews other studies,

primarily those focusing on the Internet and relevant
to informing media literacy curricula.
Continuing a long tradition in studying the
diffusion of Arab media technology, a number of
recent audience studies dealt with the impediments
to the adoption and diffusion of the Internet in the
Arab world. Warf and Vincent (2007) blamed low
Internet penetration rates, high cost of Internet
access and computer ownership, low literacy rates,
and the lack of Arabic content online as impediments
to Internet diffusion. The study found cultural factors
impeded virtual community development, including
the patriarchal system, restrictive gender roles, and
the fact that group rights often surpass individual
ones, which has contributed to conservative circles
contesting Internet diffusion and the state using such
contestation for coercive control. The study also
found government censorship and monitoring to be
serious barriers to the development of the Internet.
Consistently, the 2009 Arab Knowledge Report
confirmed that Internet penetration and the number
of computers per person in most Arab countries
stood below the global average. Yet the report noted
that the growth rate in Arabic content is the highest
among the top ten Internet languages. It stressed the
importance of integrating digital and media literacy
into the education system, as Arab governments have
put little efforts towards this endeavor.
In contrast, Rinnawi (2011) emphasized the
paradox Arab governments face in dealing with the
Internet, explaining that Arab governments attempt
to develop and simultaneously restrain the Internet.
“At the same time that they are aware of its
importance to their economic development and its
vitality in attracting foreign investments, they
perceive it as a factor that affects the political and
social stability of their countries” (123).
Hroub (2009) challenged the perspective that
the only source of control of the Internet in the Arab
world comes from government and proposed that
religious authorities offer a second primary form of
control. Hroub claimed that the Internet’s impact on
Arab society is over blown and warned against
overestimation of its potential, as it is largely elitist
and confined to narrow circles. “With the continuity
of socio–political authoritarian systems coupled with
illiteracy rates and technological poverty, the
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Internet stays on the margin both as a public sphere
of freedom and as a venue for political action” (271).
While the preceding tackled the numerous
obstacles to Internet adoption, a number of studies
emphasized the Internet’s potential as a platform for
democratic reform and political change.
Emphasizing blogs, Etling et al. (2010)
mapped the Arab blogosphere and found the Arabic
networked public sphere clustered nationally and
focused on local issues. Only few regional topics
united the network, primarily Palestine. Despite
predominantly covering personal issues, Arab blogs
nevertheless contained rich political discussions. In
addition, more blogging activities occurred in certain
geographic areas, particularly the Arab East and
Egypt, in addition to an English bridge group that
interpreted local events to audiences in the West. It
found the Arab blogosphere is a “political discourse
space apparently free of government control”
exhibiting a mix of top–down and bottom–up agenda
setting dynamics (1240). This suggests that media
literacy case studies should focus on local rather than
regional (Arab) experiences.
Consistently, Hofheinz (2005) maintained
that Internet technology has not been able to curtail
expanding freedoms despite rampant censorship,
while Lynch (2007) argued that the blogosphere
represented a new medium for Arab political
mobilization that could potentially break state
controlled media by providing the foundations of a
new Arab public sphere.
In contrast, Haugbolle (2007) critically
analyzed the Lebanese blogosphere between 2005
and 2006, questioning the assumption that the
introduction of free media automatically contributes
to the development of democratic societies.
Haugbolle noted that by facilitating informal modes
of communication, blogs do open space for those
blocked from official and mainstream news
channels. The study rejected generalizations about
Lebanese public opinion derived from studying the
blogosphere, as it remained dominated by the
educated and economically privileged.
Consequently, it would be important to understand
how Arab youth perceive blogs as trustworthy news
sources.
More recently, a handful of studies centered
on online and social media uses. A 2009 survey that

explored the knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of
Iraqi youth and adolescents aged 10–30 found that
one–third of Iraqi youth know how to use computers,
but only 13 % described their knowledge level as
“good,” and only 13 % said they had used the
Internet, with twice as many males as females saying
so (Iraq National Youth 2009). Among Internet
users, three-quarters used it for surfing websites,
while half used it for chatting, an indication that the
web is mainly a source for entertainment rather than
news and political activism.
Focusing on the UAE, Al–Jenaibi (2011)
used survey and focus group methods to study social
media uses. The initial findings revealed that
Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn were among the
most popular social media. Emiratis felt adept at
using social media, perceived them in a positive
light, and used them frequently. In addition,
participants felt confident about social media’s
abilities to credibly and accurately relay information,
compared to traditional media.
In a more comprehensive study of social
media uses in the Arab world, Mourtada & Salem
(2010) provided evidence for a rapidly increasingly
number of Facebook users across the region, with the
highest penetration rates in the Gulf region and
Lebanon. Despite lower penetration rates in Egypt,
the almost five million Facebook users in that
country made up over one–fifth of the region’s users.
The study found Facebook to be dominated by male
and young users. When it came to gender, Lebanon
and Jordan were among the top four gender–
balanced countries. The UAE came in 10th place.
Additionally, the study found some Arab countries
have more Facebook users than Internet users, an
indication that users access Facebook through
mobile phones. With few exceptions, Facebook
usage positively correlated with a host of economic
and development indexes, including GDP per capita,
Internet penetration rate, Human Development
Index, and Digital Access Index. The exceptions,
such as Saudi Arabia, the study contends, may be
related to social and cultural norms and sensitivities.
Finally, Internet freedom in each Arab country did
not correlate with Facebook usage.
In an ambitious study to map media uses in
the Arab region, Dennis, Martin, and Wood (2013)
surveyed audiences in eight Arab countries. They
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found that Television remains the top medium for
news and entertainment across the region, while the
Internet continues to occupy a larger space,
especially in the Gulf countries that are better wired.
Similarly, the use of the Internet, social media, and
mobile technologies, while widely spread across the
region, tended to be higher in countries with better
IT infrastructures. The study also found a wide
generation gap but a smaller gender gap for Internet
use, and it concluded that Arabic is the main
language used to access media, followed closely by
English, but the latter lead in some countries when it
came to accessing the web. In addition, most
participants supported freedom of expression online,
but paradoxically also supported more regulations
for the Internet. Moreover, the majority had positive
views about the Internet as a source for information,
but only about half the participants saw that the
Internet helped strengthen their political influence
and gave them a stronger say in government policies.
In sum, the majority of these studies tended
to focus on impediments to the adoption and
diffusion of the Internet while others examined the
potential of the Internet, especially the blogosphere,
as potential for political reform. Even studies that
tackled media uses directly tended to focus on
limited media, examined general levels of internet
use in different Arab countries as compared to their
development indexes, and studied basic attitudes
towards internet regulations and benefits. Therefore,
this is frames media uses of Arab youth within media
literacy with the aim of better informing digital and
media literacy curricula and teaching. It surveys
various digital and social media uses of Arab youth
by answering the following questions and comparing
them across countries, genders, age groups,
education levels, and income levels:
RQ1. What characterizes uses of social media
and blogs?
RQ2. How are online and social media perceived
as news sources?
RQ3. How are online and social media perceived
as entertainment tools?
RQ4. What characterizes attitudes toward
Internet restrictions and the trustworthiness of
online content?

RQ5. What characterizes attitudes toward the
Internet in general?
Methodology
This study used a cross–sectional survey
methodology. It used a self–administered survey
approach for efficiency and to avoid interviewer bias
and maximize respondent privacy.
The study surveyed 2,744 high school and
university students in Jordan, 1 Lebanon,2 and the
UAE, 3 using a cluster sampling technique. In cluster
sampling, researchers draw groups rather than
individuals, which improves the response rate and
allows for efficient surveying. A cluster was defined
as a high school or university classroom.
Researchers categorized the schools and universities
in the three countries according to tuition level
(lower–, middle–, upper–income), location (urban,
rural), gender, (male–only, female–only, mixed),
orientation (religious/missionary, secular), language
(Arabic/English, Arabic/French, Other), and
ownership (public/private). At least two schools
from each category in each country where contacted.
Most attempts to get access to public, lower–income,
and rural schools failed. This skewed the sample in
favor of urban middle–to–upper–income private
schools and universities. From the final list of 43
schools and universities, researchers selected
purposively two to four classes, taking into
consideration gender, age, and language diversity.
Jordan, Lebanon and the UAE were selected
mainly for pragmatic reasons—given the easy access
to schools and universities without the need of
official government permission—and because they
offer relatively high literacy rates (90% and higher,
according to the World Factbook), as well as a large
number of schools and universities.
Although 2,744 filled the paper
questionnaires, only 2,477 were deemed valid for
use. The (un–weighted) demographics of the final
sample ended up as follows: Most participants came
1

Sample size: 874 (459 from universities and 415 from
schools).
2
Sample size: 1109 (352 from universities and 757 from
schools).
3
Sample size: 761 (135 from universities and 626 from
schools).
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from Lebanon (48 %), followed by the UAE (28 %)
and Jordan (24 %). Most participants were female
(56 %). All participants were aged 13 to 28, with 79
% of them between 16 and 21. Most (63 %) were
still in school. Most came from high schools that
taught Arabic and English (62 %), followed those
that taught Arabic, English, and French (19 %).
Similarly, the vast majority said they fluently spoke
Arabic (88 %), followed by English (70 %) and
French (15 %). The vast (84 %) were not employed,
and most (63 %) claimed an income or allowance of
$250 or less per month.
Although the sample was skewed in favor of
urban middle–to–upper–income private schools and
universities, it nevertheless represented much of the
youth demographics of the three countries. The vast
majority of inhabitants in Jordan (78 %), Lebanon
(87 %), and the UAE (78 %) live in cities. The three
countries have relatively high literacy rates (96, 90,
and 90 %, respectively) and high school–life
expectancy (13, 13, and 11 years, respectively)
(World Factbook n.d.).
The questionnaire comprised 59 close–ended
questions and one open–ended question and required
15 minutes to complete. The questionnaire was
grounded in published academic and commercial
studies (e.g., Pew Internet 2009; Kaiser Family
Foundation 2007), and took into consideration local
cultures. The questionnaire was pretested and
translated into Arabic, and reverse–translated into
English to ensure translation reliability.
All uses and attitudinal questions used a
four–point ordered response scale measured at the
ordinal level, while some frequency–of–use
questions for specific periods used a seven–point
ordered response scale, measured at the ordinal level.
Because of the sample skew, the researchers
implemented a data weighting procedure, using
SPSS, giving a 1.5 weight coefficient to “lower to
middle income” participants, and a 0.5 weight
coefficient to middle to upper income participants.
The weighted dataset was analyzed using frequency
tables, cross–tabulations, and correlation tests. A
chi–squared significance level of p ≤ 0.05 and a 5%
difference between compared variables was
considered significant.
The independent variables used for
comparison were: country of residence, gender, age

group, education level, and income level. For
simplicity, age groups, education levels and income
levels each included only two groups: 18–28 years
old versus 17 or younger, those with a high school
degree or higher versus those with some high school
education or less, those of middle–to–upper income
versus those of lower–to–mid income, respectively.
Surveying in the Arab world comes with its own
difficulties, and using cluster sampling has some
significant limitations. First, the researchers faced
difficulties in securing permission from the selected
universities and students. These difficulties varied
from non-responsiveness and rejection to participate,
to refusal to allow certain questions, especially those
relating to religion, in the survey questionnaire.
Some of these difficulties contributed to skewing the
study sample. In addition, the sampling used did not
allow for statistical generalization. However, the
researchers made sure to include a diverse and
mostly representative sample of the population under
study. Finally, survey methodology does not allow
for the rich information that can be gathered through
qualitative methods, such as depth interviews or
focus groups.
Results
Organized by research question, this section
starts with general results for each research question
then compares the variables across the countries,
genders, age groups, education levels, and income
levels.
Uses of Social Media and Blogs. Participants
were asked how often and for what purposes they
use social media and blogs, and what languages they
use to write blogs.
The vast majority (87%) said they had used
social media, with no significant differences
appearing between the compared groups. Among
those who had used social media, 84% used it
mainly for fun, 84% to connect with existing friends,
58% to connect with family, 55% to make new
friends, and 41% to express their opinions. Only 9%
used social media to conduct business, and 5% used
it for political activism.
Some differences emerged between
countries, genders, and income levels. First,
Lebanese and Jordanians were more likely than
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Emiratis to use social media for political activism,
while Jordanians were more likely than Emiratis and
Lebanese to use it for expressing their opinions.
Second, males were more likely than females to use
social media for making new friends. Similarly,
lower income participants were more likely than
higher income participants to use social media to
make new friends.
In contrast with their social media uses, few
participants (23%) said they had ever written blogs,
and only 10% blogged at least once a day. When
comparing groups, males tended to blog more
frequently than females, but no other differences
registered.
Among those who blogged, 68 % wrote
about music/entertainment news, followed by
arts/culture (37%), sports (33%), travel (25%),
science/technology (23%), international news (20%),
health (18%), and religion (17%). Local politics
garnered 15%, followed by Arab political news
(14%) and economic/financial news (11%).
Lebanese subjects blogged most frequently
about local politics and least frequently about
religion. Jordanians blogged the most about
music/entertainment and arts/culture, and the least
about economic/financial news. Emiratis blogged the
most about international news. Males blogged more
than females about sports, science/technology, and
local politics, while females blogged more about
music/entertainment and arts/culture. As for
education level, participants of lower education level
were more likely than those of higher education level
to blog about music and entertainment and less likely
to blog about local political news. Older participants
blogged more than their younger counterparts about
Online video services ranked second with
59% using them as news sources at least once a day.
Here too, Lebanese and Jordanians used this news
source less than Emiratis. Those of higher income
also used them more than those of lower income.
Social media followed with 52% using them as news
sources at least once a day. The same trend emerged
between countries with Lebanese using them less
than Jordanians and Emiratis, and higher income

local politics and less about music/entertainment.
Finally, higher income participants blogged more
than lower income participants about international
news.
Furthermore, the vast majority of bloggers
primarily wrote in English (81%). Only 11% used
Arabic, and 4% used French. In addition, 4% wrote
in both Arabic and English. When comparing, those
of higher income used English more often than those
of lower income, while the latter used Arabic more
than the former. Lebanese used French the most,
while Emiratis used English the most.
Social Media and Blogs as News.
Participants chose how frequently they used various
media sources for news. They also responded to
whether certain values are associated with news
accessed through blogs and social media.
The vast majority of surveyed participants
received most of their news from television and
word of mouth (friends/family), followed by
professional websites, online video services, emails,
SMS, social media, print media
(newspapers/magazines), radio, and—at the bottom
of the list—blogs (See Table 1). This section focuses
on professional web sites, online video services,
social media, and blogs.
Professional news websites ranked as the top
online news source with 59% of participants using
them at least once a day. Lebanese were slightly less
likely than Jordanians and Emiratis to use
professional news websites (at least once a day). In
addition, older participants, those with higher
education, and those of higher income used news
websites more often than their counterparts.
participants using them more. Blogs ranked last with
only 16% using them as news sources at least once a
day. Jordanians were less likely to use them
compared to Lebanese and Emiratis. In addition,
older participants and those of higher education used
them more often.
Table 2 reveals some values participants
associated with news acquired from blogs, social
media, online video services, and professional news
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Table 1
Uses of Various Media as News Sources

websites. Participants were asked whether they
describe these news sources as trustworthy,
untrustworthy, independent, government controlled,
objective, or biased. A simple index was then
calculated by subtracting the percentage of

participants who agreed with each of the three
opposing pairs. Only professional web sites received
a positive index value (+11) for trustworthiness,
suggesting they were perceived as the most
trustworthy news source compared to the other three.

Table 2
Values Associated with News from Online Media Sources
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On, the other hand, blogs received the highest
negative index (-28), suggesting they were perceived
as the least trustworthy news source, followed by
social media (-17), and online videos (-7).
Social media (+12) and online videos
services (+12), followed closely by blogs (+9),
offered a higher positive index for independence.
This suggests they were perceived as more
independent than professional websites (+4).
Finally, the objectivity index suggested that
professional websites (+12) were perceived as more
objective than online video services (0), while both
were perceived as more objective than social media
(-3) and blogs (-7).

Social Media and Blogs as Entertainment
Participants answered questions about the use
of media for entertainment. They were also asked to
allocate certain values to social media and blogs.
Participants spent many hours daily on
entertainment-related media activities, substantially
more than what they spent on news. In fact, 55
percent of participants spent over three hours per day
using media for entertainment, while only 10 percent
did the same for news. Watching television, using
mobile phones, and listening to music ranked as the
top entertainment-related media activities. Table 3
focuses on the use of online media tools for
entertainment.

Table 3
Use of Media for Entertainment and Leisure

Social media topped the list of entertainmentrelated online media activities with 54% using them
at least once a day. Jordanians used social media for
entertainment the most, and so did higher income
participants. Chatting online came in second (47%).
Lebanese chatted online the most, and so did higher

income participants. Next came watching videos
online (44%). Emiratis, males, and higher income
participants used videos online for entertainment
more than their counterparts. Talking on
Skype/VOIP followed (36%). Next came Internet
games (33%). Emiratis, males, and lower income
22
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Table 4
Values Associated with Social Media and Blogs

participants played online games more than their
counterparts. Finally, reading blogs was the least
popular entertainment activity, with only 15% saying
they read blogs for entertainment at least once a day.
Emiratis and males used this medium for
entertainment more than their counterparts.
Participants associated certain values with
social media and blogs. Their responses were ranked
for easier interpretation, as shown on Table 4.
For social media, the top three values participants
chose were exciting, distracting, and addictive,
followed by essential, efficient, beneficial, liberating,
and harmful. The three lowest ranked values were
boring, educating, and difficult.
As for blogs, the top three values were
distracting, boring, and difficult. Then came
essential, efficient, exciting, liberating, and harmful.
The lowest three ranking least popular values were
beneficial, addictive, and educating.
Attitudes toward Internet Restrictions and
the Trustworthiness of Online Content. Participants
responded to attitudinal questions about online
restrictions, about the trustworthiness of online
content, and whether they used real names or fake
profiles online. The purpose of these questions was
to gage participants’ attitudes toward freedom of
expression online, their critical awareness of the

veracity and accuracy of online content, and their
alertness to online surveillance and privacy threats—
three matters that tie into media literacy
competencies.
When asked about their attitudes toward
Internet restrictions, a slight majority (52%)
advocated no or fewer restrictions on Internet
content (21% chose no restrictions), and 48%
supported more restriction or an Internet ban (8%
chose ban). Emiratis, males, and lower income
participants were more likely to choose no/fewer
restrictions.
When asked about the trustworthiness of
online information, 83%described it as somewhat or
very trustworthy (71% chose somewhat trustworthy).
Emiratis trusted online content more than Lebanese
and Jordanians.
When asked whether they used their real
name or a fake profile for various online activities,
the majority said they used real names for all online
media in question. More specifically, 86% used their
real names on social media. Lebanese and Jordanians
were more likely than Emiratis to do so. The same
applied to those of higher income and higher
education.
Similarly, 82% used their real names for
email, with Jordanians and Lebanese more likely to
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do so than Emiratis. Again, participants of higher
income and those of higher education were more
likely than their counterparts to do so.
Next, 69% used their real names for chatting
online, with substantially more Lebanese doing so
compared to Jordanians and Emiratis. The same
applied to participants of higher income.
Finally, 61% used their real names for
tweeting, and 53% did so for blogging, although
only few participants blogged or tweeted, with
differences between categories parallel to the
preceding media.
Attitudes toward the Internet. Participants
responded to attitudinal questions about their
perceptions of online tools. These questions aims to
better understand whether participants see the
Internet as a positive or negative tool for personal
and political empowerment and whether they are
aware of online media’s negative aspects, such as
distraction from work and school and its potential to
offer surveillance opportunities for government
institutions. It also aims to assess whether the
Internet as a medium is perceived as a corruptive
force—a sentiment that accompanied the
introduction of almost all new media, especially
TV—and weather participants appreciate it for its

potential as a political instrument or more as a mode
of entertainment.
Almost all somewhat or strongly agreed that
the Internet offers great entertainment opportunities
and helps them with work/schoolwork. A substantial
majority agreed the Internet helps them express their
opinions, helps them advocate their causes/beliefs,
and distracts them from work/schoolwork. A
substantial minority agreed the Internet poses threats
to their privacy, helps corrupt them, helps the
government monitor them, and helps them influence
government, while one-third agreed the Internet
helps them gain political power. See Table 5. The
latter highlights the low ranking of the Internet as a
political tool in participants’ minds, particularly in
comparison to the Internet as an entertainment tool.
When comparing countries, Jordanians and Emiratis
agreed more than Lebanese that the Internet helps
them express their opinions, helps them advocate
their causes, distracts them from work/schoolwork,
and helps the government monitor them, while more
Emiratis than Lebanese and Jordanians agreed the
Internet helps them gain political power. In addition,
more participants of higher education agreed the
Internet helps them advocate their causes, poses
threats to their privacy, helps the government
monitor them, and helps them influence government.

Table 5
Attitudes Towards the Internet
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More higher income participants agreed the
Internet distracts them from work, poses threats to
their privacy, and helps the government monitor
them, while more lower income participants agreed
the Internet helps them influence government and
helps them gain political power. Finally, more males
agreed the Internet helps corrupt them, helps the
government monitor them, helps them influence
government, and helps them gain political power.
This may suggest a gendered rift in participants’
perception of the Internet both as a political tool and
a medium that offers vast opportunities for
government surveillance, which are perceptions
enhanced by more critical awareness of the Internet
and may also be related to social structures that have
historically pushed women out of the political
sphere.
Discussion
This study explored the media uses of youth in three
Arab countries and assessed the values these youth
associate with various online media, focusing on the
uses of social media and blogs within the context of
media and digital literacy.
Avid Consumers, Nonprolific Producers,
and Not so Media Literate Users. The study found
participants digitally savvy and adept at using digital
technologies but not necessarily media literate. They
use social media extensively, but use it more for
entertainment and networking with family and
friends rather than for news or political activism,
which is consistent with other studies (Iraq National
Youth, 2009). Participants are avid consumers of
social and digital media but not prolific producers. In
contrast with extensive use of social media by the
vast majority of participants, only few write blogs
regularly, and their blogging activities mainly focus
on entertainment and soft news. Hard news and local
and regional news garner less attention. Moreover,
participants overwhelmingly trust online content.
Despite widespread fears of privacy threats online,
most use their real names for all online media.
However, political culture may taper this trust.
Emirati participants are the least likely to use their
real names on all online media, probably due to less
freedoms and more restrictions in the UAE
compared to Lebanon and Jordan. In addition, those
of higher income, those of higher education, and

older participants are more likely to use their real
names, an indication that awareness of online threats
to privacy and other risks—a logical measure of
digital and media literacy—are not related to
education, wealth, or maturity that comes with age.
In addition, the findings show participants prefer
USA-originated web tools, and they reflect the
dominance of English among bloggers, especially
among affluent bloggers and those from the UAE,
reflecting the country’s sizable English-speaking
expatriate population (Etling et al. 2010).
A Risk-Free World of Entertainment, Safe
from Big Brother, Removed from Activism. Arab
youth tend to be highly uncritical and unaware of
social media risks, an indication of low levels of
critical media literacy and poor knowledge of online
media threats. Most participants associate the
Internet with entertainment, personal utility, and
expression, while they disassociate it from
government surveillance, privacy threats, personal
corruption, and political activism. A majority agrees
that the Internet offers great entertainment
opportunities, helps with work/schoolwork, helps
express opinions and advocate causes and beliefs,
and simultaneously distracts from work/schoolwork.
On the other hand, a majority disagrees that the
Internet poses threats to privacy, helps corrupt users,
helps government monitor users, helps users
influence government, and helps users gain political
power. This may have strong implications for Arab
political activism and the Arab uprisings in general,
as it seems to support the notion that the new
opportunities afforded by online media did not play a
central role in these uprisings or in advancing
political activism in the region—at least not in these
three countries.
Traditional Media Uses Migrate to Social
Media. Cultural factors that influence offline media
uses seem to mediate online media uses, which
suggests that traditional media literacy lessons and
theories continue to be relevant in the social media
realm. Cultural factors that influence gender roles
and gender-based values offline, such as the
(in)appropriateness of meeting new people in certain
settings, seem to be replayed in the social media
realm with females less likely to use social media to
meet new people. Moreover, similar gender trends
that exist in traditional media again surface in
blogging, with more males interested in blogging
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about sports, technology, and politics, while more
females interested in entertainment and arts and
culture. Age, education, and income seem to also
play a similar role to that in traditional media uses,
with older participants and those of higher education
more interested in local politics and less so in music
and entertainment, and higher income participants
more interested in international news.
Traditional Media Still Trump Online
Media in News and Entertainment. Media literacy
curricula should not ignore traditional (offline)
media and non-social online media, as they continue
to occupy a significant space among Arab youth and
remain more credible than social media. Television
and word of mouth remain the top sources of news,
beating all online and social media in popularity,
while radio and newspapers trail behind all online
news sources except blogs. When exclusively
comparing online news sources, professional news
websites, and online videos beat social media and
blogs, assumingly with the former’s high quality
news product and the latter’s strong audio-visual
appeal. Consistently with news sources, traditional
media (TV and listening to music) and mobile
phones dominate entertainment-related media uses.
However, unlike online news sources, social media
rank first for entertainment among online media.
Reading blogs is the least popular entertainment
activity and source of news. Validating these
perceptions are the values participants associate with
social media and blogs. Many regard social media as
exciting, easy to use, and addictive, while a majority
sees blogs as boring and difficult to use. In addition,
many perceive both social media and blogs as
distracting and not educating. Finally participants do
not strongly perceive either as liberating, beneficial,
or harmful, further supporting an apathetic view of
social media and blogs when it comes to political
activism. Moreover, the analysis of values specific to
news reveals that participants view news from blogs
and social media as untrustworthy and biased but
simultaneously independent. In contrast, they regard
professional news websites as more trustworthy and
objective but also less independent. Online video
services offer mixed results, as participants perceive
them as somewhat untrustworthy and relatively
independent, but the perception about their
objectivity is mixed.

Traditional Obstacles to Internet Diffusion
Still at Play with Social Media. Media literacy
curricula should take into consideration IT
infrastructure, access to Internet, and political culture
in each Arab country. Technological development,
interest in events abroad, and diversity and
prolificacy of the traditional local press may account
for differences in the social media uses of each
country (Kraidy 2002). Emiratis, who enjoy the most
developed Internet infrastructure, but the least
diverse local press, are more likely than Jordanians
and Lebanese to use all online and social media for
news. Technological development seems to also play
a role in online entertainment. Emiratis use online
videos, online games, and blogs for entertainment
more than their Lebanese and Jordanian
counterparts. Tied to technological development is
the affordability of Internet services both for news
and entertainment (Rinnawi 2011). The findings
show affluent participants more likely to use
professional web sites, online videos, and social
media for news and more likely to use social media,
online forums, and online video services for
entertainment. Furthermore, the cultural and political
factors that inhibit Internet diffusion in the Arab
world (Loch et al. 2003; Warf and Vincent 2007)
extend to views surrounding Internet restrictions.
The number of participants who advocate fewer
restrictions on Internet content is virtually equal to
that of those who prefer more restrictions. In
addition, participants from countries that experience
the most Internet restrictions (UAE then Jordan) tend
to advocate fewer restrictions more than participants
from countries that experience few or no restrictions
(Lebanon).
Conclusion
The study found that surveyed Arab youth are avid
and adept consumers of online and social media,
particularly of Western media tools and for
entertainment purposes, but are not prolific
producers of online and social media, especially for
the blogosphere. They tend of overly trust online
content, which suggests low digital media literacy
levels. Political activism was low on their priority
list, as they tend to view social media and blogs as
tools for entertainment that are largely perceived as
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safe of government surveillance and privacy risks.
The same obstacles that inhibit Internet diffusion and
adoption remain at play with social media and
blogging uses, especially technological development
and cultural restrictions. Similarly, media uses that
dominate traditional media are echoed in the social
media and blogging spheres, including the
differences between genders, incomes, ages, and
education levels. Furthermore, popular traditional
media, particularly TV, remain more popular than
online media for both news and entertainment.
Therefore, the findings suggest a strong need
for developing and advancing media literacy
education in the Arab region, as the results indicate
low critical media literacy rates and little awareness
of online media threats among Arab youth, despite
proficiency in using digital technologies but
primarily for entertainment purposes. In addition, the
findings indicate that media literacy curricula and
theories that focus on traditional media remain
relevant, especially that cultural factors that
influence offline media uses also apply to online
media uses, while traditional media continue to
occupy a significant space among Arab youth and
remain more credible than social media. Finally,
media literacy curricula should differentiate between
Arab countries when it comes to priorities, topics,
and focuses, taking into consideration each country’s
IT infrastructure, access to Internet, and political
culture. Furthermore, given the differences between
the countries when it came to responses about the
Internet’s potential for political activism and
government surveillance threats, it is important to
emphasize the latter for Lebanese curricula and
highlight the former for Emirati and Jordanian
curricula.
More in-depth research is needed to assess
the specific media literacy needs and to guide the
development of curricula, as well as research that
focuses on critical thinking and analytical skills of
Arab youth when it comes to consuming and
producing media messages.
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